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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12561118#action_12561118
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Rick Hillegas commented on DERBY-2109:
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>So I think we can agree that a user has a unique identity, can we call this
>UID? This corresponds to what is stored in the system tables.
I'm afraid that when I read these words, they sound like this to me: "A person
has a unigue identity, a UID, which is stored in the system tables." I don't
agree with this. Two persons (Edward and EdWard in my example) end up with the
same identity. The identity is not unique. That's a problem.
As a practical matter, I don't think that we can please everyone:
1) A customer whose authentication service enforces the case sensitivity of
usernames is probably going to want to grant privileges to case-sensitive
names. This customer is not going to be happy if the payroll clerk EdWard gets
the shutdown privilege intended for the system administrator Edward.
2) On the other hand, a customer whose authentication service treats Edward and
EdWard as the same username is not going to want to have to grant shutdown
privilege to every casing combination.
Maybe we could add a userNamesAreCaseSensitive() method to UserAuthenticator or
create a CaseSensitiveUserAuthenticator interface to extend UserAuthenticator?
Given a case-sensitive UserAuthenticator, we would not have to throw Edward and
EdWard into the same schema. The default behavior would be the current
behavior. And the default behavior for SystemPrincipal would be, as Dan
suggests, that usernames are case-insensitive.
This distinction could be added later on. I don't see that we have to support
case-sensitive usernames in 10.4.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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