Chrome has pinning too (in fact, Firefox's baseline list for HSTS and
pinning is extracted from there). AFAIK, Mozilla just didn't ask for
their domains to be pinned in Chromium. I don't think lack of support
for MITM attacks is a bug that should be addressed. It's a security
liability even when used internally by an organization.

The system certificate store is used for everything else, so if you're
not looking at the bigger picture it has little value. However, it does
have real value because it provides a lot of leverage with the CAs via
the browser's usage share. It's also the system certificate store on
many platforms (Linux, *BSD) and using it universally keeps it tested
and maintained.

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