On 17/11/15 08:25, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> writes:

There are a couple of rules that may create false positives, so please don't
assume every certificate on the sheet is problematic.

That's still pretty scary, nearly 50,000 names from a who's-who of commercial
CAs.  Yet more evidence that, like the output from the EFF SSL Observatory, we
need independent assessment of browser PKI rather than self-certification ("we
define ourselves to be in full compliance with everything we need to be
compliant with, as far as we can tell").

Peter.

Peter (G),

I fully agree that independent assessment is useful, but independent assessments need to be assessed too (preferably before the press start quoting soundbites! :-) )

Peter (B),

Thanks for doing this report. There are definitely some interesting findings. However, I would like to discuss several classes of (what I think are) false positives that cover a significant number of the "anomalies" you've found:

- RFC5280 sections 7.2 and 7.3 do indeed talk about the need for dNSNames, domainComponents, etc, to only contain ASCII data. However, your report also flags Subject CNs with non-ASCII data - AFAICT, this is permitted by both RFC5280 and the BRs. It is common practice to put the "xn--" ASCII string in a dNSName and the UTF-8 string in the Subject CN.

- You wanted to check that "public CAs were following the CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements" when issuing certs. However, some of the certs in your report were issued before any of the browsers / audit regimes demanded that public CAs be compliant with the BRs. Furthermore, some of the certs in your report were issued before the BRs even existed.

- You wanted to check "server auth certificates issued by public CAs". However, I see some Code Signing Certificates in your report.

I'm pretty optimistic that all of the "anomalies" issued by Comodo's CA system (except for the 8 mentioned in our recent incident report) will be found to fall into these categories, although I haven't done an exhaustive analysis yet. If there are any other "anomalies", they're a bit lost in the noise at present!

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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