On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 6:50 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 21/04/17 18:19, Eric Mill wrote: > > The FPKI cross-signs at issue in Issue L are now expired (and so don't > show > > on the links above). They do show when expired certificates are included > -- > > there are 6 of them with OU=FPKI: > > https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=1384 > > > > Each of those certificates lack a pathlen:0 constraint, and appear to be > > the only ones that do. Symantec noted that they are path length > constrained > > in their response, but since they also referenced Federal PKI policy OIDs > > (which are not respected by Web PKI clients), I thought it was worth > being > > explicit about the difference between the certificates referenced here > and > > those referenced in Issue L. > > In other words, the FPKI cross-signs weren't path length constrained and > so promulgated trust from the entire FPKI, but the Issue Y intermediates > are constrained and so the impact is less? > Depends on what you mean the impact being less? They were both "unaudited", unconstrained sub-CAs, the only difference is whether they could be used to issue new sub-CAs. But given the controls - and importantly, the capabilities which have been acknowledged with Issue Y regarding domain controllers - it's still virtually unlimited impact by arbitrary parties. However, it does mean you don't have the full FPKI in scope. However, that feels a bit like saying the unconstrained sub-CA was expired by the time the public discussion began, and thus the impact was less. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
