Could you explain how it benefits Mozilla users to optimize for OV or EV,
given that it does not provide any additional security value?

It seems far better for the security of users, and the ecosystem, to have
such certificates revoked in 24 hours. If the subscriber's selection of
certificate type (e.g. OV or EV) makes it difficult to replace, then that's
a market choice they've made, given that it offers no objective security
value over DV, and it being possible to replace that certificate with a DV
certificate in a timely fashion.

24 hours is enough for most subscribers to get a reissued certificate. I
don't think we should speculate about what cost it is (that's between them
and the CA) or their selection of validation type (of which, for objective
security value, only the domain name matters).

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:39 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <> wrote:

> But that would require the issuer of the replacement cert (which might
> not be a fast-issue DV cert) to complete validation in something like 36
> hours, which is much shorter than the normal time taken to do proper OV
> and/or EV validation.
> I have previously suggested 14 days for live certificates that don't
> cause actual security issues.  This would be enough for most subscribers
> to either get a reissued certificate (for free) from the original CA or
> set up an account with a competing CA and get at least a basic OV cert.
> On 10/08/2017 03:02, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
>> No objection to 72 hours v. 1 business day.  I agree it should be short
>> and
>> 72 hours seems perfectly reasonable .
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: dev-security-policy
>> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.
>> com@lists.mozilla
>> .org] On Behalf Of Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy
>> Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:57 PM
>> To:
>> Subject: Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers
>> On Wednesday, August 9, 2017 at 9:20:02 AM UTC-5, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
>>> All CAS are required to maintain the capability to process and receive
>> revocation requests 24x7 under the baseline requirements. The headache is
>> not with the CA. Rather, it's notifying the customer that their
>> certificate
>> will be revoked before the start of the next business day. Having a one to
>> two business day rule  instead of 24 hours for non compromise issues gives
>> the end entity time to receive the notification and replace their
>> certificate with a compliant version.
>> I'm sure many customers would absolutely prefer that and on the surface it
>> does sound like a good solution. However, I think it's another example of
>> the general difference of opinion between people on this list around
>> whether
>> we should be holding CAs to the highest standards or not. These mis-issued
>> certificates are typically not a security concern, but they speak to
>> either
>> ignorance on the part of CA operators or a pattern of lackadaisical
>> controls
>> within the issuance systems. Neither of these is acceptable behavior at
>> this
>> juncture. Conformance with the BRs has been mandatory for over 5 years
>> now.
>> Customers need to be made aware of the failures of their chosen providers
>> and the responsibilities incumbent upon them as subscribers, and if their
>> own certificate installation/replacement processes are sufficiently
>> archaic
>> as to make it difficult to replace a certificate in an automated fashion
>> then they should rectify that immediately.
>> That said, to continue the thought experiment, what does "1-2 business
>> days"
>> really mean?Does the CA get 1-2 business days followed by 1-2 for the
>> customer? What if there's a holiday in the CA's country of operations
>> followed by a holiday in the customer's home country? How quickly does
>> this
>> window extend to 2+ weeks? If you were to go down this path I'd strongly
>> prefer it to be a hard deadline (e.g. 72 hours) and not anything related
>> to
>> business days.
> Enjoy
> Jakob
> --
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
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