On 11/08/2017 00:12, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
Could you explain how it benefits Mozilla users to optimize for OV or EV, given that it does not provide any additional security value?
Of all the browsers I have tried, Firefox is the one that most
aggressively promotes EV certificates, going to the extent of displaying
unhelpful status messages ("This website does not supply ownership
information") for OV and DV certificates.
It seems far better for the security of users, and the ecosystem, to have such certificates revoked in 24 hours. If the subscriber's selection of certificate type (e.g. OV or EV) makes it difficult to replace, then that's a market choice they've made, given that it offers no objective security value over DV, and it being possible to replace that certificate with a DV certificate in a timely fashion.
Note that I was considering the desirability of the subscriber switching CAs in response to such events (others have argued for that in this thread). If the subscriber switches to a different CA, that CA has no validation data on file. Also, the way the BRs specify the validation data reuse period and the maximum certificate validity period, they encourage the creation of situations where certificates expire long after the validation data reuse limit. Some CAs go out of their way to avoid that, but it is not a BR requirement.
24 hours is enough for most subscribers to get a reissued certificate. I don't think we should speculate about what cost it is (that's between them and the CA) or their selection of validation type (of which, for objective security value, only the domain name matters).
The only cost consideration I mentioned was a strong suggestion that if the original CA issues the replacement certificate, the CA should bear the cost.
On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:39 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:But that would require the issuer of the replacement cert (which might not be a fast-issue DV cert) to complete validation in something like 36 hours, which is much shorter than the normal time taken to do proper OV and/or EV validation. I have previously suggested 14 days for live certificates that don't cause actual security issues. This would be enough for most subscribers to either get a reissued certificate (for free) from the original CA or set up an account with a competing CA and get at least a basic OV cert. On 10/08/2017 03:02, Jeremy Rowley wrote:No objection to 72 hours v. 1 business day. I agree it should be short and 72 hours seems perfectly reasonable . -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert. [email protected] .org] On Behalf Of Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:57 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers On Wednesday, August 9, 2017 at 9:20:02 AM UTC-5, Jeremy Rowley wrote:All CAS are required to maintain the capability to process and receiverevocation requests 24x7 under the baseline requirements. The headache is not with the CA. Rather, it's notifying the customer that their certificate will be revoked before the start of the next business day. Having a one to two business day rule instead of 24 hours for non compromise issues gives the end entity time to receive the notification and replace their certificate with a compliant version. I'm sure many customers would absolutely prefer that and on the surface it does sound like a good solution. However, I think it's another example of the general difference of opinion between people on this list around whether we should be holding CAs to the highest standards or not. These mis-issued certificates are typically not a security concern, but they speak to either ignorance on the part of CA operators or a pattern of lackadaisical controls within the issuance systems. Neither of these is acceptable behavior at this juncture. Conformance with the BRs has been mandatory for over 5 years now. Customers need to be made aware of the failures of their chosen providers and the responsibilities incumbent upon them as subscribers, and if their own certificate installation/replacement processes are sufficiently archaic as to make it difficult to replace a certificate in an automated fashion then they should rectify that immediately. That said, to continue the thought experiment, what does "1-2 business days" really mean?Does the CA get 1-2 business days followed by 1-2 for the customer? What if there's a holiday in the CA's country of operations followed by a holiday in the customer's home country? How quickly does this window extend to 2+ weeks? If you were to go down this path I'd strongly prefer it to be a hard deadline (e.g. 72 hours) and not anything related to business days.
Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
