I agree with Eric, I would call storing the customers private keys (without their knowledge!!) as an immediate compromise and a clear breach of trust.
On Thursday, March 1, 2018 at 1:04:54 AM UTC+1, Eric Mill wrote: > Trustico doesn't seem to provide any hosting or CDN services that would > make use of the private key, nor do they appear to explicitly inform users > about the storage of this private key. > > In their statement, they say they keep the private keys explicitly to > perform revocation as necessary: > https://www.trustico.com/news/2018/symantec-revocation/certificate-replacement.php > (archived: https://archive.is/0AnyR ) > > > These Private Keys are stored in cold storage, for the purpose of > revocation. > > Their CSR/key generation form is here: > https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-new-csr-instantly.php > (archived: https://archive.is/hJV42 ) > > The storage of private keys appears to be done without the user's knowledge > or consent. And of course, only the keys they create through their form are > stored, so it is clearly not a necessary business function for most of > their certificate business. > > Finally -- the CSR/key generation form page incorporates JavaScript from at > least 5 or 6 different companies (including ad servers), which would allow > any of those third parties (intentionally or through compromise of their > own) to capture generated keys. This is a reckless amount of exposure, to > the point that even if the keys were generated completely inside the > browser and never exposed to the server (which does not appear to be the > case), I would consider them compromised at the time of generation. > > Given everything that's known, then regardless of who emailed whose > customers when and why, I think it's clear that Trustico compromised those > keys at _least_ at the time they were stored, if not at the time of > generation, and has been routinely compromising customer keys for years. > Emailing them to DigiCert only widened their exposure to more unauthorized > parties. > > And given that there's no evidence that Trustico has acknowledged this > fact, or indicated any intent to change their business practices, then I > believe it's appropriate for all CAs to immediately suspend or terminate > their relationship with Trustico -- as any CA who continued doing business > with Trustico would now be knowingly allowing Trustico to compromise the > keys of the certificates issued under their hierarchy. > > -- Eric _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
