> On Oct 29, 2019, at 11:17 AM, James Burton <j...@0.me.uk> wrote:
> Hi Paul,
> I take the view that the articles on the CA Security Council website are a 
> form of marketing gimmick with no value whatsoever.

[PW] More useless feedback that only serves to insult someone trying their best 
to add value. As I’ve said *over and over again*, if browser vendors did what I 
recommended in the article, my own company's flagship product would be rendered 
useless. If you call that “a form of marketing gimmick" you should probably 
avoid going into marketing. 

Every data point was taken from a competitor with links to their work. If you 
disagree with my conclusions, say so. But throwing insults is hardly adding 
value, is it? 

- Paul

> Thank you
> Burton 
> On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 5:55 PM Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy 
> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
> <mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org>> wrote:
> Hi Nick,
> > On Oct 29, 2019, at 7:07 AM, Nick Lamb <n...@tlrmx.org 
> > <mailto:n...@tlrmx.org>> wrote:
> > 
> > On Mon, 28 Oct 2019 16:19:30 -0700
> > Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy
> > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org 
> > <mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org>> wrote:
> >> If you believe the visual indicator has little or no value why did
> >> you add it? 
> > 
> > The EV indication dates back to the creation of Extended Validation,
> > and so the CA/Browser forum, which is well over a decade ago now.
> > 
> > But it inherits its nature as a positive indicator from the SSL
> > padlock, which dates back to the mid-1990s when Netscape developed SSL.
> > At the time there was not yet a clear understanding that negative
> > indicators were the Right Thing™, and because Tim's toy hypermedia
> > system didn't have much security built in there was a lot of work to
> > do to get from there to here.
> > 
> > Plenty of other bad ideas date back to the 1990s, such as PGP's "Web of
> > Trust". I doubt that Wayne can or should answer for bad ideas just
> > because he's now working on good ideas.
> [PW] I agree with your conclusion. But you’re commenting on the wrong thing. 
> You snipped my message so much that my comment above is without context. You 
> snipped it in a way that a reader will think I’m asking about the old visual 
> indicators for identity - I’m not. I asked Wayne if he thinks the new Firefox 
> visual indicator for tracking is unnecessary. 
> I don’t want to labour my points any more. Those who disagree and took the 
> time to comment, aren’t willing to exchange meaningful, constructive, 
> respectful counter arguments. Those who disagree but aren’t commenting, may 
> or may not care at all. And those who agree mostly show their support in 
> private. I feel like this conversation is sucking up all the oxygen as a 
> result.
> If we are all doing such a great job, attacks wouldn’t be on the rise and 
> phishing wouldn’t be the number 1 problem. And we all know phishing is where 
> a user falls for a deceptive website. 
> One last time, here’s the article I wrote with many data points 
> https://casecurity.org/2019/10/10/the-insecure-elephant-in-the-room/ 
> <https://casecurity.org/2019/10/10/the-insecure-elephant-in-the-room/> 
> <https://casecurity.org/2019/10/10/the-insecure-elephant-in-the-room/ 
> <https://casecurity.org/2019/10/10/the-insecure-elephant-in-the-room/>> 
> I’m going to edit this article for Hackernoon, to include additional context 
> about my support *for*encryption, https, padlock and free DV certs. I support 
> them all, obviously. But some people assume I don’t support these critical 
> elements because I pointed out the negative impact that their implementation 
> is having.
> Thanks,
> - Paul
> > 
> > Nick.
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