On 10/15/2018 04:20 PM, Stefan Eissing wrote:
Am 15.10.2018 um 16:11 schrieb Jim Jagielski <[email protected]>:
It's up to the RM on whether or not to release... one can't veto a release and
a -1 is not a veto.
Huh? I was referring to "TLS 1.3 support isn't quite yet tested enough to warrant a public
release". I wanted to point out that without attempting a public release, we may not have
found this bug for months. I am -1 on 2.4.36 as well, in case that was not clear. Don't know how
this "veto" came into this...
I don't think it was directed at anyone, just a general note that even
if we find faults with 2.4.36 we can't pull the release with a -1 unless
everyone changes their minds, as releases can't be vetoed. The RM can
choose to re-roll after some fixes have been done, but 2.4.36 will be
burned off then.
-Stefan
On Oct 15, 2018, at 10:07 AM, Stefan Eissing <[email protected]>
wrote:
Am 15.10.2018 um 15:58 schrieb Jim Jagielski <[email protected]>:
Considering all this, I am changing my vote from a +1 to a -1. I was not able to trigger this
error, but this shows, at least IMO, that TLS 1.3 support isn't quite yet tested enough to warrant
a public release, unless we are super clear that it is "experimental" or "early
access"...
I do not see it this black/white way.
We have found no regression with any SSL != OpenSSL 1.1.1.
We have not even found a bug with TLSv1.3 as such. What we have found is a
behaviour change in OpenSSL where our code relied on either changed or not well
documented behaviour.
We do not want to ship a version of httpd which has severe interop problems
with the released openssl 1.1.1.
HOWEVER: it is unclear, if this will not also trigger in some scenario when one
links 2.4.35 with OpenSSL 1.1.1.
I am all in favor of pushing a 2.4.37 immediately after this bug is fixed. We
will not solve any remaining problems by letting it stew in the repository.
-Stefan
On Oct 15, 2018, at 4:06 AM, Stefan Eissing <[email protected]>
wrote:
Am 14.10.2018 um 23:46 schrieb Daniel Ruggeri <[email protected]>:
Hi, Helmut;
Note that the vote may run longer than 72 hours as 72 is the minimum. As it
stands now, we have more than 3 binding +1 votes, but I am waiting for closure
on the conversation on-list about the tests with reported H2/TLS 1.3 failures.
Since this is one of the primary features of this release, I want to be sure
the topic gets due attention.
See my mail on the other thread. It seems that h2 traffic triggers a call
sequence that exposes a change in OpenSSL behaviour of SSL_read() between 1.1.0
and 1.1.1. It looks as if mod_ssl interpreted the return codes of SSL_read() in
a way that no longer works and that we need to change mod_ssl handling here.
Waiting on confirmation or rebuttal of my analysis on the other thread.
Cheers,
Stefan
--
Daniel Ruggeri
On October 14, 2018 4:44:04 PM CDT, "Helmut K. C. Tessarek"
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 2018-10-10 15:18, Daniel Ruggeri wrote:
Hi, all;
Please find below the proposed release tarball and signatures:
https://dist.apache.org/repos/dist/dev/httpd/
I would like to call a VOTE over the next few days to release this
candidate tarball as 2.4.36:
[ ] +1: It's not just good, it's good enough!
[ ] +0: Let's have a talk.
[ ] -1: There's trouble in paradise. Here's what's wrong.
The computed digests of the tarball up for vote are:
sha1: e40e7a879b84df860215b8a80f2a535534a1c4b4 *httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
sha256: ef788fb7c814acb2506a8b758a1a3f91f368f97bd4e6db16e98001f468e8e288
*httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
72h have passed, so what is the outcome of the vote?
