> Am 15.10.2018 um 16:11 schrieb Jim Jagielski <j...@jagunet.com>:
>
> It's up to the RM on whether or not to release... one can't veto a release
> and a -1 is not a veto.
Huh? I was referring to "TLS 1.3 support isn't quite yet tested enough to
warrant a public release". I wanted to point out that without attempting a
public release, we may not have found this bug for months. I am -1 on 2.4.36 as
well, in case that was not clear. Don't know how this "veto" came into this...
-Stefan
>> On Oct 15, 2018, at 10:07 AM, Stefan Eissing <stefan.eiss...@greenbytes.de>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Am 15.10.2018 um 15:58 schrieb Jim Jagielski <j...@jagunet.com>:
>>>
>>> Considering all this, I am changing my vote from a +1 to a -1. I was not
>>> able to trigger this error, but this shows, at least IMO, that TLS 1.3
>>> support isn't quite yet tested enough to warrant a public release, unless
>>> we are super clear that it is "experimental" or "early access"...
>>
>> I do not see it this black/white way.
>>
>> We have found no regression with any SSL != OpenSSL 1.1.1.
>> We have not even found a bug with TLSv1.3 as such. What we have found is a
>> behaviour change in OpenSSL where our code relied on either changed or not
>> well documented behaviour.
>>
>> We do not want to ship a version of httpd which has severe interop problems
>> with the released openssl 1.1.1.
>> HOWEVER: it is unclear, if this will not also trigger in some scenario when
>> one links 2.4.35 with OpenSSL 1.1.1.
>>
>> I am all in favor of pushing a 2.4.37 immediately after this bug is fixed.
>> We will not solve any remaining problems by letting it stew in the
>> repository.
>>
>> -Stefan
>>
>>>
>>>> On Oct 15, 2018, at 4:06 AM, Stefan Eissing <stefan.eiss...@greenbytes.de>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Am 14.10.2018 um 23:46 schrieb Daniel Ruggeri <drugg...@primary.net>:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi, Helmut;
>>>>> Note that the vote may run longer than 72 hours as 72 is the minimum. As
>>>>> it stands now, we have more than 3 binding +1 votes, but I am waiting for
>>>>> closure on the conversation on-list about the tests with reported H2/TLS
>>>>> 1.3 failures. Since this is one of the primary features of this release,
>>>>> I want to be sure the topic gets due attention.
>>>>
>>>> See my mail on the other thread. It seems that h2 traffic triggers a call
>>>> sequence that exposes a change in OpenSSL behaviour of SSL_read() between
>>>> 1.1.0 and 1.1.1. It looks as if mod_ssl interpreted the return codes of
>>>> SSL_read() in a way that no longer works and that we need to change
>>>> mod_ssl handling here.
>>>>
>>>> Waiting on confirmation or rebuttal of my analysis on the other thread.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> Stefan
>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Daniel Ruggeri
>>>>>
>>>>> On October 14, 2018 4:44:04 PM CDT, "Helmut K. C. Tessarek"
>>>>> <tessa...@evermeet.cx> wrote:
>>>>> On 2018-10-10 15:18, Daniel Ruggeri wrote:
>>>>> Hi, all;
>>>>> Please find below the proposed release tarball and signatures:
>>>>> https://dist.apache.org/repos/dist/dev/httpd/
>>>>>
>>>>> I would like to call a VOTE over the next few days to release this
>>>>> candidate tarball as 2.4.36:
>>>>> [ ] +1: It's not just good, it's good enough!
>>>>> [ ] +0: Let's have a talk.
>>>>> [ ] -1: There's trouble in paradise. Here's what's wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> The computed digests of the tarball up for vote are:
>>>>> sha1: e40e7a879b84df860215b8a80f2a535534a1c4b4 *httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
>>>>> sha256: ef788fb7c814acb2506a8b758a1a3f91f368f97bd4e6db16e98001f468e8e288
>>>>> *httpd-2.4.36.tar.gz
>>>>>
>>>>> 72h have passed, so what is the outcome of the vote?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
