On Tuesday 29 May 2007 04:45, Chris Carlin wrote: > Joel C. Salomon wrote: > > On 5/28/07, Joel C. Salomon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> This tool has one great advantage over #freenet-refs -- it only > >> follows pre-existing "facebook friend" relationships and exposes the > >> fact that both are on freenet only to the people in question. > > > > Oops -- cancel that; seems you can tell who downloaded the > > application. Is there any way to remove those data from the app page? > > > > --Joel > > I think you guys are being a little too critical about this. > > The application helps people create links between people who are > authenticated (by facebook) and whose real life relationships can be > traced from person to person. Clearly it helps direct friends connect, > but it also helps people determine the authenticity of friends of > friends. No the facebook auth and connections are fully trustworthy, but > then it's up to users to determine their level of trust. This is still > lightyears better than #freenet-refs. > > Not to mention that it may spread knowledge about freenet to people who > don't read slashdot daily. > > As for being able to detect freenet users through this app, why is that > such a big deal? It's not as if freenet is undetectable; my employer > called me up the next day telling me to get freenet off my office > computer. If the government really cared the lack of this application > wouldn't make all that much difference.
Freenet is not undetectable but it should be hard to detect. If the attacker actually owns the hardware you run it on, well, that's different. But generally I think this is a good thing. It lets those you have added as friends see that you are running freenet, correct?
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