Matthew John Toseland <matt...@toselandcs.co.uk> writes: > On 13/09/17 21:23, Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: >> Matthew John Toseland <matt...@toselandcs.co.uk> writes: >>> Proposal 0: Bundles >>> ------------------- >> Do I understand it correctly that this means that all inserts from a >> given source initially travel along the same path? > Right, this is the poor man's tunneling scheme. Although one day perhaps > we could have something like PISCES.
Poor mans tunneling (=simplest tunneling which could work) sounds like something pretty useful. >> It would be great to have this for requests, too, since this would >> clearly stop most correlation attacks which are used right now. … >>> Proposal 1: Scarce SSKs with global (per-node) scarcity >>> ------------------------------------------------------- >> … >>> Proposal 2: Scarce SSKs with per-key scarcity and multiple versions >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >> … >>> Proposal 3: Scarce SSKs with voting >>> ----------------------------------- >> … >> I don’t really understand these three. They all sound like they could >> leak information from the anonymous ID layer to the networking layer. > > I don't see why. Maybe you can make an argument re voting schemes. But > what is wrong with proposal 1 that makes it any different security-wise > to what happens now? I think the core problem is that I don’t quite understand what you’re proposing. Bundles I understand, but I don’t understand how the scarce SSKs change routing. My reason to worry is that when something on the content layer (for example pseudonyms) affects routing, it can be detected from routing performance. Do you want to provide spam defense, or do you want to provide some kind of fairness? Or even deeper into my missing understanding: How should multiple SSKs compete at all, given that only one person has the private key? Best wishes, Arne -- Unpolitisch sein heißt politisch sein ohne es zu merken
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