On Jul 1, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Dave Crocker <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 6/20/2014 12:38 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
>> Here is some draft text to consider for a DMARC working group charter:
>
>
> G'day,
>
> I've looked over the small amount of mail posted about the draft charter
> and do not see any changes mandated.
>
> Apologies if I've missed something, and I assure you it wasn't
> intentional. So please do re-state the suggestion.
>
> Otherwise, I think the major question now is whether there is general
> consensus on submitting this draft charter text to the IESG?
Dear Dave,
I do not think the charter is adequate. It needs to address the topic related
to authorizing third-party use. Otherwise, it is not possible to address the
resulting disruption when reject is ever desired in conjunction with a mixed
use domain. At this point, it seems wrong to expect this problem will somehow
evaporate.
Several have suggested things like DKIM-Delegate, CDKIM, and the like.
Frankly, your DKIM-Delegate distributes less data than would using the
TPA-Label. However, TPA-Label requires much smaller DNS resources assuming
public key retraction is to remain an important control aspect. IMHO, reliance
on expiry represents a poor option.
Improvements in DMARC features (identifier alignment, reporting, policy
preferences) will be considered, such as:
- Enumeration of data elements required in "Failure" reports
(specifically to address privacy issues)
- Handling potential reporting abuse
- Aggregate reporting to support additional reporting scenarios
- Alternate reporting channels
- Utility of arbitrary identifier alignment
- Utility of a formalized policy exception mechanism
+- Domain Federation or Authorization scheme. See DKIM-Delegate or TPA-Label
drafts as examples.
Our company is willing to work with any large ISP to demonstrate use of
TPA-Label.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-otis-tpa-label
Such a conclusion is easily supported since only the DMARC domain receives
feedback necessary to acknowledge and mitigate abuse of the From header field.
As such, ONLY the DMARC domain is able to indicate which other domains are
permitted (authorized or federated).
Phishing and spoofing is an extremely serious problem NOT addressed using
anti-SPAM techniques. If there is some time available in any upcoming meeting,
I would like to take a few minutes to review this matter and relate our
company's experience.
Regards,
Douglas Otis
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