Hi Steven, Thank you for your comment.
You can download from the following link. https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/agenda.html - Virtual DMARC: DMARC verification without record definitions I will send you directly just in case. Regards, Genki --- Genki YASUTAKA Rakuten, Inc. Mail: [email protected] -----Original Message----- From: dmarc [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Steven M Jones Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2018 4:15 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] [Request] Presentation in IETF101 I want to thank Yasutaka san for presenting the Virtual DMARC proposal. I believe the situation he and his colleagues are addressing would benefit from more attention. The meeting materials at IETF do not seem to include Yasutaka san's slides. If I didn't just miss it, would it be possible to share that presentation? Aside from changes to the "dmarc=" allowed values in Authentication-Results: - and I think this echos a point made during the session - the underlying issue seems to be the use of DMARC-style alignment checks in the absence of a DMARC policy record. That practice may be useful to the receiver's evaluation of SPF and DKIM results. Perhaps that should be explored as a receiver/authenticator best practice. It may be _very_ useful to capture these statistics to make it clearer to domain-owners/senders that more current email traffic would pass DMARC checks than they may presently realize. I would definitely like to explore that further. But DMARC is based on cooperation between domain-owner/sender and authenticator/receiver. And it depends on the explicit opt-in/request-for-treatment from the domain-owner, signaled by a public DNS record, and the reporting mechanisms so that the domain-owner/sender can correct errors in implementation of authentication measures. Virtual DMARC seems to be discussing only what happens within the authenticator/receiver, but perhaps I have missed this part. I look forward to re-reading the proposal and slides with this in mind. --Steve. Steve Jones DMARC.org, LinkedIn, crash.com, etc. _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
