On Thu, Apr 27, 2023, at 9:30 AM, Brotman, Alex wrote:
> Attempt to make it a tad more concise (I think), altering some of the
> language:
>
> ---------------------
> There can be inherent damage to the ability to use certain SMTP-based systems
> in conjunction with a policy of quarantine or reject. These could include,
> though are not limited to, mailing lists, forwarding services, and other
> types of indirect mail flows. Especially in situations where the sending
> domain is SPF-only, or the intermediary is known to alter messages. If the
> users of the domain may utilize these types of systems, the domain
> administrator MUST NOT deploy a policy of quarantine or reject without
> serious considerations to the impact to interoperability. These
> considerations will be informed by careful analysis of DMARC aggregate
> reports prior to deploying such a policy. Some third-party systems may be
> willing to create a workaround for these situations, though it cannot be
> guaranteed. Domain owners MAY choose to create a sub-domain
> (listmail.example.org) or cousin domain (listmail-example.org) which uses a
> different policy for users wishing to utilize those services.
> ---------------------
I like this, and it gives room for best common practices to evolve that don't
necessarily conflict.
s/
Especially in situations where the sending domain is SPF-only, or the
intermediary is known to alter messages. If the users of the domain may
utilize these types of systems, the domain administrator MUST NOT deploy
/
For situations where the sending domain is not DKIM signing all of its
traffic in an aligned fashion or there is legitimate use of an intermediary
known to alter messages, the domain administrator MUST NOT deploy
/x
Jesse_______________________________________________
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