On 17 Nov 2026, at 20:03, Philip Homburg <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> Good question! I personally think a resolver should refetch the data >>> it has in the cache that does not live up to a client's request for STRICT >>> privacy. >> >> OK, then I misunderstood what you had in mind for this. >> >> My assumption was that the client is expressing requirements for >> how the resolver will process cache misses. If there's no cache >> miss, there's no special handling required. > > If an attacker has control over a resolver's cache then a timing > attack is possible. Can you say more about the attack? If an attacker has control over the resolver in general then all bets are off. If an attacker is able to time a query from some other client and introduce data to a resolver's cache which is subsequently used to respond to a second client, how is the second client's privacy reduced? I think the intent of the client with respect to responses generated from the cache is important; I don't think a resolver can meet the requirements of a client if they don't agree about whether answers constructed from cached data (that might have previously been obtained over plain text transport) meet it. Joe _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
