[EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy

[Ken Johnson]

Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:31:18 -0700 From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Ken Johnson wrote: Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700 From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ... IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections. In a zero-info election with five candidates, where my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, I would vote something like: A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) > E(0.0) The idea is that subsequent ratings are low enough that they don't detract much from my first-choice vote in each round. And if my first choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my voting power always goes to my highest remaining choice. ... Bart, It seems to me that a limitation of this strategy is that if candidate A is left standing in the last round, then you have very little say in who A is running against. What if you have very high, and nearly equal, sincere ratings of A, B, C, and D, and a very low rating for E? Your highest priority is to ensure that E is eliminated. What then would be your strategy? The same. ... Bart, Let's look at this in simpler terms. Suppose my ONLY objective is to eliminate E. I have no preference between A, B, C, and D. Consider the following two IRNR strategy options: (1) A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.000001) > D(0.000000001) > E(0.0) (2) A(1.0) = B(1.0) = C(1.0) = D(1.0) > E(0.0) Can you illustrate a situation in which the first strategy, but not the second, would result in E's defeat? More generally, if my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, what would be wrong with the following strategy? A(1.0) > B(0.999999999) > C(0.999999) > D(0.999) > E(0.0) The ideas is that the ratings other than the last are close enough that they don't detract much from by last-choice vote in each round. And if my last choice is ever eliminated, the bulk of my (negative) voting power always goes to my lowest remaining choice. Ken Johnson