Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Ted,
I'm still not getting it. Let me lay out my calculations more explicitly just to be sure I'm not making any silly mistakes. I'll use "|" to indicate the approval cutoff (I like to be different).
27: A|B 24: B result: C wins 49: C
27: A 24: B result: C wins 49: C
27: A|B 24: B>A result: A wins 49: C
27: A 24: B>A result: A wins 49: C
Do you agree with these results?
Considering these four cases, A wins if the 24 B voters approve A as their second choice, or C wins if they don't. In either case, the outcome is not affected by whether or not the 27 A voters rank their unapproved candidates. Hence I don't see why this case is relevant to the issue of allowing ranking of unapproved candidates.
The fact that A wins when the 24 B voters approve A seems reasonable to me. Sure, those B voters might regret having approved A, but at least they'll get one of their approved candidates elected.
Don't ask me what I was thinking when I wrote that last sentence. No, the B voters won't regret having approved A because it changed the winner from C to A, a step in the right direction for the B voters. Duh!
--Russ ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
