Hi,
--- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�:
> >> Consider this case. Original true preferences:
> >> 27: A>B
> >> 24: B>A
> >> 49: C
> >> A is the Condorcet winner. Now consider what happens if B defects
> >> via truncation:
> >> 27: A>B
> >> 24: B
> >> 49: C
> >> Under RP(wv), Beatpath(wv) or DMC, B wins. B voters have gotten a
> >> better result by dropping a lower preference. This is an example of
> >> the "Later No Hurt" violation of Condorcet completion methods -- B
> >> voters hurt their favorite by adding a lower-ranked preference.
> >> But if A puts the approval cutoff above B, B can't win in DMC:
> >> 27: A>>B
> >> 24: B
> >> 49: C
> >> C wins, anyway you cut it, as you found. There's no LNHurt
> >> situation
> >> here because B can't win either way. So the best the B voters can do
> >> is to add a preference for A. That's what I mean by the poison pill
> >> (by the A voters). Is it clear now?
I have an even better idea that doesn't require an approval cutoff:
If there is no CW, elect the Borda loser.
(Somewhat less arbitrary, more clearly punishment.)
Kevin Venzke
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