On 26 Apr 2005 at 13:43 UTC-0700, Kevin Venzke wrote: >H> i, > > --- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�: >> >> Consider this case. Original true preferences: >> >> 27: A>B >> >> 24: B>A >> >> 49: C >> >> A is the Condorcet winner. Now consider what happens if B defects >> >> via truncation: >> >> 27: A>B >> >> 24: B >> >> 49: C >> >> Under RP(wv), Beatpath(wv) or DMC, B wins. B voters have gotten a >> >> better result by dropping a lower preference. This is an example of >> >> the "Later No Hurt" violation of Condorcet completion methods -- B >> >> voters hurt their favorite by adding a lower-ranked preference. >> >> But if A puts the approval cutoff above B, B can't win in DMC: >> >> 27: A>>B >> >> 24: B >> >> 49: C >> >> C wins, anyway you cut it, as you found. There's no LNHurt >> >> situation >> >> here because B can't win either way. So the best the B voters can do >> >> is to add a preference for A. That's what I mean by the poison pill >> >> (by the A voters). Is it clear now? > > I have an even better idea that doesn't require an approval cutoff: > > If there is no CW, elect the Borda loser. > > (Somewhat less arbitrary, more clearly punishment.) > > Kevin Venzke
I didn't see a smiley, but I assume one was implied. -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
