On 20 Apr 2005 at 22:51 UTC-0700, Russ Paielli wrote: > Ted, > I'm still not getting it. Let me lay out my calculations more explicitly > just to be sure I'm not making any silly mistakes. I'll use "|" to > indicate the approval cutoff (I like to be different).
<snip> > > Do you agree with these results? You're missing the point, which is, how does approval cutoff change the result? You would have seen what I meant if you had changed the cutoff to a simple ">" ranking. I will summarize this well-discussed example for you. It is worth careful study. Consider this case. Original true preferences: 27: A>B 24: B>A 49: C A is the Condorcet winner. Now consider what happens if B defects via truncation: 27: A>B 24: B 49: C Under RP(wv), Beatpath(wv) or DMC, B wins. B voters have gotten a better result by dropping a lower preference. This is an example of the "Later No Hurt" violation of Condorcet completion methods -- B voters hurt their favorite by adding a lower-ranked preference. But if A puts the approval cutoff above B, B can't win in DMC: 27: A>>B 24: B 49: C C wins, anyway you cut it, as you found. There's no LNHurt situation here because B can't win either way. So the best the B voters can do is to add a preference for A. That's what I mean by the poison pill (by the A voters). Is it clear now? So a good DMC strategy is Rank all candidates you are willing to see elected, from your favorite to your "hold-your-nose-and-swallow-just-barely-tolerated" candidate. Put your approval cutoff just below the candidate with the best shot at winning. (I think this is Forest's Approval voting criterion). Here, that means that the A voters cutoff below A. B voters, realizing this is the strategy, will add a lower preference for A. C voters, if they realize they're in the minority, might then decide to rank their preferred opposition alternative below the cutoff. If they despise A, they might actually vote for B in sufficient numbers to turn the election around. But you don't get this effect if you remove the approval cutoff. > Those schemes might or might not be acceptable. I realize they seem > very simple to you, but I think they may still be too complicated > for major public elections. Also, I don't like the idea of requiring > the voter to actually write a number. That's asking for trouble > because the written number will sometimes be ambiguous. I find writing a number to be much faster than filling in an optical cell! > > I envision something like the Graphical Voter Interface (GVI > http://ElectionMethods.org/GVI.htm) that I developed a while back Can't see the screenshots: Permission Denied The area you are trying to access has been closed off by the server administrator. > just for kicks. It has a column of buttons, each about a half inch > high by 3 inches wide, with a candidate's name and party on each > one. You select them in order of preference by simply touching them > on a touchscreen (or clicking on them with a mouse on a conventional > monitor). You can always backtrack, of course. You can specify equal > rankings by touching a selected candidate a second time (GVI doesn't > currently allow that, but it could be added). Woowee. Screen takeover. Watch those colors and fonts! I'm not sure I find that more intuitive. Anyway, I favor paper ballot counting, period. Machines would be used only for assistance. What does your software do then? > > Remember that there is little or no time for "training," so the > interface needs to be as simple as possible -- especially for > Democrats! 8^) No slurs, please ;-). Techno-illiterates come in all stripes. Ted -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
