Andrew Myers wrote: > I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet > voting. I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune > to strategic voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, > voters cannot improve the election result from their perspective > by voting insincerely).
I wish that were true. But sometimes a Condorcet election can be manipulated by creating a cycle where none existed before. Here's one example: 45:R>A>C 20:A>C>R 35:C>A>R A is the Condorcet winner and wins. But if the C>A>R voters strategize: 45:R>A>C 20:A>C>R 35:C>R>A a A>C>R>A cycle results. Some Condorcet methods, like Baldwin (Borda-elimination) and Arrow-Raynaud (minimax-elimination), now give C as the winner. I'm sure someone else will post a more compelling example. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
