Hi All,
What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
BR, Juho
On Sep 3, 2005, at 05:40, Andrew Myers wrote:
Hi all,
I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet
voting.
I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic
voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve
the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is
there
an appropriate paper to cite that makes this argument clearly? Thanks
much,
-- Andrew
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
