Dear Jobst,
--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> But you suggest not this easy countermeasure but a more difficult one:
>
> > Now, imagine you are in the 17% A>B>>C faction, and you are aware of the
> > situation. The only
> > way you can prevent C from winning is by insincerely disapproving of A.
>
> It is true that they can perform this, but it is false that this is the only
> strategy for the
> A-voters to prevent the C-voters from manipulating the election by burying.
> In fact, it is far
> more natural for the A-voters to just approve B which effectively protects B
> from losing.
>
> You could answer that this requires that some of the last 10% approve B but
> that they perhaps
> won't do so since they don't care which of their non-approved candidates B,C
> wins. But then you
> assume that the actual sincere preferences are rather like this:
One faction (that is, one arbitrary partition of the voters) can only control
what
it does itself. You're saying that the 17% faction doesn't have favorite
betrayal
incentive, because a different faction should have voted differently.
When I say "incentive" I only mean the opportunity; I don't mean to imply that
voters would necessarily be aware of, or inclined to think of, this opportunity.
Kevin Venzke
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