Dear Adam!
In both your examples,
> 9% C>>B>A
> 15% C>>A>B
> 25% C>A>>B
> 12% B>C>>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 17% A>B>>C
> 10% A>>B>C
and
> 5% C>>B>A
> 5% C>>A>B
> 39% C>A>>B
> 12% B>C>>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 25% A>B>>C
> 2% A>>B>C
in which the C-voters insincerely buried the sincere Condorcet Winner B, the
straightforward counterstrategy for those who prefer B to C is easy and
requires no insincere rankings (as would wv require): They just need to vote
their sincere rankings and approve of B and everything above B.
> 9% C>>B>A
> 15% C>>A>B
> 25% C>A>>B
> 12% B>>C>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 27% A>B>>C
I said so various times, but you continue talking about the 17% alone without
considering the whole situation. Obviously, when we are talking about
counterstrategy, the relevant group of voters is those who prefer the sincere
winner to the manipulated winner, in this case all who prefer B to C. This
group has in DMC a sincere counterstrategy, but needs insincere equal-ranking
in winning votes.
I consider it considerably less relevant what kind of counterstrategies some
small and special subgroup of those who prefer the sincere winner has.
Yours, Jobst
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