On 9/9/05, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
It is true that they can perform this, but it is false that this is the only strategy for the A-voters to prevent the C-voters from manipulating the election by burying. In fact, it is far more natural for the A-voters to just approve B which effectively protects B from losing.
You could answer that this requires that some of the last 10% approve B but that they perhaps won't do so since they don't care which of their non-approved candidates B,C wins.
That is one possibility, but another is that the A>>B>C voters are simply unwilling to cast a "dishonest" vote. They have a clear favorite, and a "lesser of two evils", and they want to cast a vote that reflects precisely that set of preferences.
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