Dear Adam! > That is one possibility, but another is that the A>>B>C voters are simply > unwilling to cast a "dishonest" vote. They have a clear favorite, and a > "lesser of two evils", and they want to cast a vote that reflects precisely > that set of preferences.
Right. They must decide whether to apply counterstrategy to prevent their greater-evil from winning in a situation in which their lesser-evil is known to be the Condorcet Winner. I probably would do so. However, it is "dishonest" as you said. But strategic voting (including counterstrategy) is by definition "dishonest". We could discuss whether insincere equal ranking for top is more dishonest or whether approving one more candidate is more dishonest... Yours, Jobst ______________________________________________________________ Verschicken Sie romantische, coole und witzige Bilder per SMS! Jetzt bei WEB.DE FreeMail: http://f.web.de/?mc=021193 ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
