MMP still enforces proportionality based on parties - as opposed to STV's non-party based method. That is somewhat undesirable, and does make the legislature more party rather than individual-based. Also, it creates situations such as the rule I heard they use in New Zealand whereby if you switch parties, you have to resign Parliament (after all, your seat is tied to your party). For that reason, it seems like STV is ideal for PR - it gives us the benefits of PR without eliminating district representation or enforcing party lines and party discipline.
Regarding IRV, I do know it isn't ideal. In fact, if someone can show me it's necessarily worse than plurality, I'd just stick with plurality in single-winner and use STV in multi-winner. However, I'm hesitant to throw two new systems at a student government relucant to even consider one - and I think many are in the same boat... The idea of Condorcet with a threshold is interesting, though... On this topic, does anyone know of a modified, kind-of-Condorcet-but-not-quite method which preserves later-no-harm? This may be interesting as a starting point...
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