Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Tim Hull wrote:
Condorcet, on the other hand, does not suffer
from the center squeeze. However, it suffers from the opposite problem -
the so-called "Pro Wrestler" or "Loony" syndrome in an election with a
couple polarized candidates and a weak centrist or joke candidate. In my
student government elections, I picture this being a candidate walking
around campus in a clown suit and winning based on becoming everybody's #2.
Also, Condorcet's later-no-harm failure may mean people give a less sincere
ranking than in IRV, though this failure is far less so than in range.
This is a potential problem with all pure Condorcet methods.
It might be able to be overcome with some restrictions
Candidate must have >5% first preference votes or be one of the top 5
candidates in number of first preference votes.
Or some other restriction might help.
I can see why this is a marketing/propaganda problem, but not why it is
a *real* problem.
One reason why not is that Condorcet gives serious candidates incentive
to contest the centre so if the
election is serious then at least one serious centrist will run and one
will win. If the election isn't serious then
why is "polarised candidate" necessarily a better winner than a weak
centrist or even a "joke candidate"?
While I agree party lists are "rotten".
there are lots of other multi winner PR systems, that don't require a
party list
MMP where the "top-up" comes from the best of the losers.
How exactly does this version of MMP work?
Chris Benham
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