On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 00:05:28 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
My goal is using Condorcet, but recognizing that everything costs
money, wo we need to be careful as to expenses.
Thus I see:
Condorcet as the election method.
But then see no value in a "condorcet party".
Also then see no value in primaries, but know parties see value
in such.
The idea of having a Condorcet party is to gradually transform Plurality
elections into Condorcet elections.
Disturbing existing elections by marrying in something from Condorcet seems
very destructive considering possible benefits, so how about:
Run a phantom Condorcet election with current candidates before the
existing voting.
Candidates can drop out if they choose:
Third party candidates have little to lose.
Major party candidates risk static as to why they did not dare.
Those who choose to, vote via internet.
Thus we have ballots to count and report on as a sort of poll.
And no value in runoffs - Plurality needs runoffs because of the way
voters cannot express their thoughts - but Condorcet has no similar
problem.
Runoffs are not perfection even in Plurality - look at the recent French
election for which voters thought of rioting when neither runoff contender
was popular.
With Condorcet they offer little possible value - every voter could rank
A>B, A=B, or B>A at the same time as doing any other desired ranking.
Also, if there is no CW there are at least three candidates in a near tie -
want to put the N candidates in a "runoff"?
Condorcet runoffs may have value if the people decide to play dirty and
always use strategy. Since the runoff must be honest (with only two
candidates, the optimal strategy is honesty), it hedges the risk since
the best of the two will always win.
How much strategy need concern us with Condorcet? The plotters need an
accurate picture of their starting point. The plotting is complex because
of the tournament counting. Then they must advertise their plot to their
friends while keeping that a secret from their enemies.
I think the best way would be to have two Condorcet methods, one that
produces very good results, and one that produces worse results but is
near-unaffected by strategy. Then if there's a CW, he wins, otherwise
the winner of one method faces the winner of the other. That would be
extremely complex, though, and it's likely that people aren't going to
be so conniving that something like that would be required.
How bad can you get, and still be a flavor of Condorcet to brag about?
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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