Good Morning, Kristofer
re: "Even without rigid monitoring, there should be a
counteracting measure. After all, the councilmembers work
on behalf of the people, so if they start consistently
diverging from what the people want, there should be a way
of directing them back. This way must not be too strict, or
we get short term interest on one hand and populism on the
other. It should still be there; I think that's partly the
point of the bidirectionality we're talking about, although
it's not limited to "counteraction", but also involves
information (to guide)."
Absolutely!!!
The other day, you mentioned the idea that those not selected at the
highest level should have a role in advising the person selected (You
may not have said it exactly that way, but that's the way I interpreted
it.) I'd like to look at that a bit more carefully.
At present, in the United States, our elected officials have 'staffs',
including legislative assistants. I understand many of our (so-called)
representatives do not even read the legislation they vote on ... they
let their 'legislative aides' do it.
Now, that's a travesty, if I've ever heard one.
The people who reach the highest levels have already been carefully
examined. They advanced because they were considered worthy by a large
number of people. We should avail ourselves of that pool of talent.
I've already mentioned using them as a source from which appointive
offices are filled. In addition, following your thought, they can
function as advisors to the elected official. The only question is the
level of formality we attach to the role.
Whoops! That's exactly what you're saying, isn't it:
"My idea was that even the unselected helped the selected
become selected. In one sense, they used their power (what
one may call that power) to reach an agreement. Therefore,
the selected are to some extent accountable to them; which
makes sense if you go all the way down, where the people
(except the candidates) are all ultimately unselected. As
you say, formal power might not be the way to do so, though."
I was wrong. In addition to the points you've made, such an arrangement
would provide a training ground for candidates by exposing them to the
legislative process. It would also provide an anti-corruption buffer.
I'm not sure how we should implement the concept, but I'm sure we should
do so.
We seem to be in agreement that the bidirectional capability of the
process affords us the means of allowing the electorate to influence
their representative's acts, after election. I think we're agreed that
those who reach the highest levels but are not elected should have a
role in, at least, advising our elected officials. We have not yet
precisely described the method of implementation, but that's because
we're still exploring the possibilities.
The idea of matrices seems (to me) to add complexity. It's true the
data can be processed by machine, and, once it's set up, it will seem
simple enough. But, I think that hides the complexity and transfers the
decision making to the programmer that devises the algorithm. It does
not encourage us to think about and justify each decision we make. Is
there not a more direct way?
I'm not sure the idea of 'weighting' the input of constituents based on
the level they attain is a good one. Our interest in politics waxes and
wanes throughout our lives. It's entirely possible a person will opt
out at the lower levels many times before experiencing a desire to
participate. Indeed, that's an important aspect of Practical Democracy;
it allows us to participate, to the full extent of our ability, whenever
our interest is aroused.
Fred
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