On Tue, 23 Dec 2008 23:05:56 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum > Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 9:54 PM
Ok, I did not say it clearly.
Obvious need is to package arguments such that they are salable.
Take the one about a Condorcet winner with no first preferences. Ugly
thought, but how do you get there? Perhaps with three incompatible
positions that share equally all the first preferences, while a neutral
candidate gets all the second preferences.
Assume it will never happen, so do not provide for such? As I suggested
before, somehow, if you assume such fate will, somehow, prove you wrong.
Provide a fence, forbidding getting too close to such? Where do you put
the fence without doing more harm than good?
Leave it legal, while assuring electors they should not worry about it ever
occurring? I see this as proper - it is unlikely, yet not a true disaster
if it does manage to occur.
Interesting points, but I don't think any of them address the problem I identified.
It is no answer at all to say "Obvious need is
to package arguments such that they are saleable.". The ordinary electors will
just not buy it when a weak Condorcet winner is a
real likely outcome.
Does "real likely" fit the facts? Some thought:
Assuming 5 serious contenders they will average 3rd rank with CW doing
better (for 3, 2nd). Point is that while some voters may rank the CW low,
to be CW it has to average toward first rank to beat the competition.
Or, look at the other description of CW - to be CW it won all counts
comparing it with other candidates - for each the CW had to rank above the
other more often than the other ranked above the CW (cycles describe nt
having a CW).
I do not think you have to be anywhere near the zero first-preferences Condorcet
winner scenario to be in the sphere of "politically
unacceptable". I am quite certain that the 5% FP CW would also be politically
unacceptable, and that there would political chaos in
the government in consequence. The forces opposed to real reform of the voting
system (big party politicians, big money, media
moguls, to name a few) would ensure that there was chaos, and the electors
would have an intuitive reaction against a weak Condorcet
winner so they would go along with the demands to go back to "the good old
ways".
I said in an earlier post that I thought a strong third-placed Condorcet winner
could be politically acceptable, and thus the voting
system could be saleable if that was always the only likely outcome. So I
have been asked before where I thought the tipping point
might be, between acceptable and unacceptable. I don't know the answer to that
question because no work has been done on that -
certainly not in the UK where Condorcet is not on the voting reform agenda at
all. In some ways the answer is irrelevant because
the Condorcet voting system will never get off the ground so long as a 5% FP
Condorcet winner is a realistic scenario, as it is when
the current (pre-reform) political system is so dominated by two big political
parties.
So long as the domination stays, Condorcet does not affect their being
winners. It helps electors both vote per the two party competition AND
vote as they choose for third party candidates.
Only when (and if) the two parties weaken and lose their domination would
the third party votes do any electing.
The primary battle between Clinton and Obama here presents a strong
argument for getting rid of Plurality elections - better for them both to
go to the general election fighting against their shared foe, McCain.
This represents a VERY idealistic view of politics - at least, it would be so
far as the UK is concerned. NO major party is going
into any single-office single-winner election with more than one party
candidate, no matter what the voting system. Having more
than one candidate causes problems for the party and it certainly causes
problems for the voters. And there is another important
intuitive reaction on the part of the electors - they don't like parties that
appear to be divided. They like the party to sort
all that internally and to present one candidate with a common front in the
public election for the office. But maybe my views are
somewhat coloured by my lack of enthusiasm for public primary elections.
So long as the general election would be Plurality, the parties DESPERATELY
needed to offer only single candidates there. Thus the Democrats had to
have a single candidate.
Clinton and Obama invested enormous sums in the needed primary - apparently
the Democrats were unable to optimize this effort. If the general election
was Condorcet the Democrats could have considered a truce in this internal
battle and invested all that money in making sure McCain lost.
Per your enthusiasm note, we see primaries as a normal way to decide on a
single candidate for each party in the general election. How is this
handled in the UK - you agree the deciding needs doing.
Actually, the Electoral College complicates this discussion for
presidential elections but it does apply to others.
Yes, the Electoral College is a "complication" in any discussion about choosing
a voting system for the possible direct election of
the US President. As a practical reformer, that's one I would leave severely
alone until every city mayor and every state governor
and every other single-office holder in the USA was elected by an appropriate
voting system instead of FPTP. But then I don't have
a vote in any of those elections!
James
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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