Seems the thoughts can be split.
The examples under discussion were a very limited subset of what is
possible: A majority preferred M>R, and another majority preferred M>D
(knowing this much, comparing R vs D does not matter).
Other elections could have had more interesting rankings, and perhaps
have required more complex thoughts as to majorities - such as you write of.
Stretched thought: "In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a
little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last."
Look at the ranking of such a CW - hard to get to be liked better than the
opposition when the opposition often ranks higher:
x>CW - counted for every voter for every candidate ranked above CW.
x=CW - not counted (mostly for pairs where a voter did not rank either).
CW>x - counted where a voter ranked x below CW, or did not rank x.
DWK
On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 20:56:03 -0500 Terry Bouricius wrote:
Dave,
I think you make a common semantic manipulation about the nature of a
Condorcet winner (particularly in a "weak" CW example) by using the term
"wins by a majority." In fact, each of the separate and distinct pairwise
"majorities" may consist largely of different voters, rather than any
solid majority. This is why I think the Mutual-Majority Criterion is a
more useful criterion. In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a
little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last. The
phrase "wins by a majority" creates the image in the reader's mind of a
happy satisfied group of voters (that is more than half of the electors),
who would feel gratified by this election outcome. In fact, in a weak CW
situation, every single voter could feel the outcome was horrible if the
CW is declared elected. Using a phrase like "wins by a majority" creates
the false impression that a majority of voters favor this candidate OVER
THE FIELD of other candidates AS A WHOLE, whereas NO SUCH MAJORITY
necessarily exist for there to be a Condorcet winner. The concept of
Condorcet constructs many distinct majorities, who may be at odds, and
none of which actually need to like this Condorcet winner. I am not
arguing that the concept of "Condorcet winner" is not a legitimate
criterion, just that its normative value is artificially heightened by
saying the candidate "wins by a majority" when no such actual solid
majority needs to exist.
Terry Bouricius
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Ketchum" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 7:23 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business
objecting?
52 of 100 prefer M over D
53 of 100 prefer M over R
Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.
As to my "no first preferences" example, surest way to cause such is to
be
unable to respond to them.
DWK
On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
James Gilmour had written:
It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected
by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33%
for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable,
ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be
elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two
candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences.
Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never!
Dave Ketchum > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM
Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
Second preferences?
That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for
they
are likely enemies of each other.
The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5%
makes this seem possible.
Could elect a candidate who got no first preference
votes? Seems unlikely.
I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and
acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
Any other unlikely to be a winner.
What were you thinking of as weak winner?
I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all. The "no first
preferences" example is so extreme I would not consider it
realistic. But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first
preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be
disastrous.
The two situations I had in mind were:
Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; "centrist" candidate M
Election 1
35% D>M; 33% R>M; 32% M
Election 2
48% D>M; 47% R>M; 5% M
M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political
consequences of the two results would be very different. My own view
is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the
result of the second election would be unacceptable to the
electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored
completely!). If such an outcome is possible with a
particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system
will not be adopted for public elections.
James
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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