Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting?
52 of 100 prefer M over D
53 of 100 prefer M over R
Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.
As to my "no first preferences" example, surest way to cause such is to be
unable to respond to them.
DWK
On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
James Gilmour had written:
It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected
by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33%
for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable,
ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be
elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two
candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences.
Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never!
Dave Ketchum > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM
Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
Second preferences?
That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they
are likely enemies of each other.
The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5%
makes this seem possible.
Could elect a candidate who got no first preference
votes? Seems unlikely.
I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and
acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
Any other unlikely to be a winner.
What were you thinking of as weak winner?
I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all. The "no first preferences"
example is so extreme I would not consider it
realistic. But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first
preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be
disastrous.
The two situations I had in mind were:
Democrat candidate D; Republican candidate R; "centrist" candidate M
Election 1
35% D>M; 33% R>M; 32% M
Election 2
48% D>M; 47% R>M; 5% M
M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of
the two results would be very different. My own view
is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of
the second election would be unacceptable to the
electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored
completely!). If such an outcome is possible with a
particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not
be adopted for public elections.
James
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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