I disagree with your characterization that in your example C does not have majority support because all 100 voters prefer C over at least two other candidates,
However, I see your point that the numerical total value of votes received by C, is not a majority out of the total numerical value of all votes counted. Cheers, Kathy On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 1:59 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> wrote: > Kathy Dopp wrote: >> >> James, >> >> Thanks but I don't need to read any references, the arithmetic is obvious. >> >> In Borda there can be more than one candidate with majority approval >> and the candidate with the *most* majority approval may not be the >> plurality majority winner like it would be in a first round majority >> winner in IRV. >> >> Apparently your definition of majority winner, only includes first >> choice winners, and that's OK, but then an obvious consequence of your >> definition is that it compels you to admit that IRV finds "majority" >> winners far *less* often than a primary/general election or esp. lots >> less often than top-two runoff. >> >> I mean *let's get real* and start telling it like it is. > > I think what he's talking about is that Borda can fail to discover a true > majority. Consider this Wikipedia example, for instance: > > 51: A > C > B > D > 5: C > B > D > A > 23: B > C > D > A > 21: D > C > B > A > > 100 voters, so A has a majority outright. But the Borda scores are (when > 0-based): > A: 51 * 3 = 153 > B: 51 + 5 * 2 + 23 * 3 + 21 = 151 > C: 51 * 2 + 5 * 3+ 23 * 2 + 21 * 2 = 205 > D: 5 + 23 + 21*3 = 91 > > so C wins. > > Borda can still be interesting, because its single winner elimination > versions (Nanson and Baldwin) pick from the Mutual majority set. The > multiwinner equivalent of mutual majority is Droop proportionality, so it > would be of interest to see if Borda-"STV" would be proportional. I don't > think it would be (given my Left-Right-Center example in another post), but > how far does it fall from the mark, and why does plain old STV pass it in > that case, given that Plurality itself doesn't pass mutual majority? > > Of course, if I could find a reweighting scheme that works for any WPS, the > generalized/altered STV doesn't have to use Borda; it can use any weighted > positional system, and even some that are not (like Range). > -- Kathy Dopp The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at P.O. Box 680192 Park City, UT 84068 phone 435-658-4657 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ Post-Election Vote Count Audit A Short Legislative & Administrative Proposal http://electionmathematics.org//ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/Vote-Count-Audit-Bill-2009.pdf History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of Election Auditing Fundamentals http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
