On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]>
> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
>> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out
>> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
>>
>
> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of
> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more
> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic
> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to
> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your
> fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion.
>
> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious";
> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having
> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and
> strategies.)
>
> Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe
> it, I knew it would lose people.
>
> I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality
> strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as
> plurality.
>
> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other
> rating-based system).
>
> You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe
> that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement
> nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be
> able to get a broader consensus from theorists.
>
> Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I
> wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes
> me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from
> plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing
> is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't
> flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is
> probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the
> few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political
> elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA?
>
> Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has
> unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from
> plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step
> that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go
> from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap,
> even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of
> the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does
> exist, I can't even blame voters for that.
>
> So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this
> statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made
> no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which
> could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you
> thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do
> you see some other option which I don't?)
>
I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want universal
assent.
If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable
to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for
rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to
IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is
at least as convincing (more so to me).
In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy
problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, strategy-resistance,
and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy category, seems to me), then
it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for advocating approval.
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