I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
JQ 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <[email protected]> > Strategy thoughts: > > Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice: My preference is G but S is > better than any lice. Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G > preferred. > > Plurality - can not vote for both. On days when I expect G to certainly > lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice. > > Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose. Simple rules > and a bit better than plurality. > > IRV - can vote for both. Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to > elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters > look at the ballots. > > Range - can vote for both. After giving G top rating, S has a strategy > headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S > losing to lice. > > Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S. > > On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> > >> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We >>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the >>> extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy >>> in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? >>> >>> >> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of >> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe >> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly >> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, >> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also >> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific >> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, >> or both. >> >> >> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree. >> >> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not >> aboard. >> >> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a >> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.) >> >> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least > marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would > happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I > think including that here would lose too many. > > Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet > tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent > to approval. > > If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving > the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any > amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all > of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign > on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems. > > Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll > stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but > I know that I'll never get everyone. > > Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does > force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's > also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating > systems".) But this is not about just me. > > JQ > >
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