2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> > On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> > >> On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn >> to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out >> of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. >> >> >> Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of >> approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more >> than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic >> voting. That is, if my preference is A>B>C, then my decision whether to >> approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of >> your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. >> >> (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is "easy" or "obvious"; >> that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having >> information not generally available about other voters' preferences and >> strategies.) >> > > Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe > it, I knew it would lose people. > > I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as > plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of > strategy as plurality. > >> >> The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other >> rating-based system). >> > > You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe > that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the > statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is > likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists. > > Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what > I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which > makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step > up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most > important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any > statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd > guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support, > and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for > real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse > SODA? > > Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval > has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from > plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step > that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to > go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger > leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the > simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of > approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that. > > So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that > this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus > made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system > which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or > do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply > impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?) > > > I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want > universal assent. >
Not universal, just as broad as possible. > > If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly > preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the > case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are > allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against > strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me). > There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from being able to sign on to this statement. Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone here will agree on any statement of that form. > > In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy > problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, > strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy > category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for > advocating approval. > Again, broadest possible consensus. Approval is nobody's favorite (I think; it certainly isn't mine), but it's a good next step, and something we can (I hope) agree on. JQ
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
