I've made this draft statement into a google doc<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US> : https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US
Probably we should continue to discuss here for a while longer, but feel free to also make suggested changes over there. (There are some "ground rules" at the top of the doc, and I trust the people here to act responsibly.) JQ 2011/8/16 Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA. But as I > keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right answer, it's > about finding the best answer that we can all agree on. > > JQ > > > 2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum <[email protected]> > >> Strategy thoughts: >> >> Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice: My preference is G but S is >> better than any lice. Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G >> preferred. >> >> Plurality - can not vote for both. On days when I expect G to certainly >> lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice. >> >> Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose. Simple rules >> and a bit better than plurality. >> >> IRV - can vote for both. Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to >> elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters >> look at the ballots. >> >> Range - can vote for both. After giving G top rating, S has a strategy >> headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S >> losing to lice. >> >> Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S. >> >> On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> >> >>> On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >>> >>> It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were "We >>>> believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality" (thought to the >>>> extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy >>>> in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? >>>> >>>> >>> No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of >>> other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe >>> that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly >>> superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, >>> approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also >>> no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific >>> change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, >>> or both. >>> >>> >>> The statement says, in effect, "Range is good, IRV is bad". I disagree. >>> >>> Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not >>> aboard. >>> >>> (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a >>> Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.) >>> >>> It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least >> marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would >> happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I >> think including that here would lose too many. >> >> Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet >> tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent >> to approval. >> >> If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving >> the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any >> amount you weaken the "these are good systems" section, weakens it for all >> of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign >> on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems. >> >> Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll >> stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but >> I know that I'll never get everyone. >> >> Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does >> force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's >> also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to "rating >> systems".) But this is not about just me. >> >> JQ >> >> >
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