R.Bristow-Johnson complained about a claim made by Clay Shentrup that range voting can elect more Condorcet winners than Condorcet methods. This sounds insane, but arises if the voters are STRATEGIC.
Then, Condorcet voting can fail to elect (what would have been with honest votes) a Condorcet winner. Meanwhile range voting with strategic voters can elect him. I've done sim experiments indicating that range voting finds honest-voter Condorcet winners more often than Condorcet methods do, if the voters are strategic. See: http://www.rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html for the details -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
