2011/10/11 Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > Hi Jameson, > > --- En date de : *Mar 11.10.11, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>* a > écrit : > > > Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range > if voters are strategic *and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls*. > > > I'm curious whether you believe the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" > claim > based on Warren's IEVS work, or for some other reason. >
Other reason; mostly because the Nash equilibrium (actually some stronger equilibrium which I forget) of approval/Range is the CW. > Because in IEVS, the polls, > if we call them polls, provide arbitrary data. Nobody is actually polled. > Yes, I know. I think this is a weakness of IEVS. > > What do you say happens if Range voters are strategic but *not* > knowledgeable? > Does that mean they place their "approval cutoffs" potentially arbitrarily? > Using some zero-info strategy or arbitrarily. > > If so, I think that would still beat all the rank methods with strategic > but not- > knowledgeable voters. In that situation every ballot's first preference > could be nearly > arbitrary, because in IEVS strategic rank voters *always* use compromise. > Yes, that's another, bigger weakness of IEVS. I find it totally implausible that Condorcet voters would all compromise AND bury, especially without good knowledge. I think that strategic condorcet could fail to give the CW in real-life situations, but it is nowhere near as bad as IEVS has it. > > Kevin Venzke > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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