2011/10/11 Warren Smith <[email protected]> > On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 8:19 AM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range > if > > voters are strategic and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls. It is > true > > for Majority Judgment under the same conditions, but also when any > fraction > > of voters are honest and ideology is one dimensional; I believe that it > > holds for N dimensions but I have not proven it. It is true for SODA if > most > > voters agree with their candidate's rankings. I believe that these > > conditions for MJ and SODA are broader than the conditions for Range. > > > > Jameson > > --But wait -- the simulations in > > http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html > > found that TopMedianRating returned fewer Condorcet winners than > average-based range voting. >
In that sim, Range elected 13279/29999 CWs, and Median elected 12472/29999. This is a significant difference, but not a huge one. On the other hand are two effects: 1. Range's greater strategy incentive 2. The tendency for voters to polarize, giving exactly one of the two frontrunners an *honest* rating near zero. This is a *separate* effect from strategic exaggeration. If true, this tendency increases the probability that an honest median vote is strategically strongest, but does not do as much for Range. > I believe these sims were conducted with random tie-breaking though > (not Balinski-Laraki > nonrandom tiebreak method). > I suspect you used enough rating categories (100?) that the difference is immaterial there. > > Maybe you should do sims first, emit flames second. > That's a fair criticism, and one I continue to violate in this message. I wonder if Kevin Venzke has any sims which speak to this question. Jameson
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
