On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 8:19 AM, Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> wrote: > Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range if > voters are strategic and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls. It is true > for Majority Judgment under the same conditions, but also when any fraction > of voters are honest and ideology is one dimensional; I believe that it > holds for N dimensions but I have not proven it. It is true for SODA if most > voters agree with their candidate's rankings. I believe that these > conditions for MJ and SODA are broader than the conditions for Range. > > Jameson
--But wait -- the simulations in http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html found that TopMedianRating returned fewer Condorcet winners than average-based range voting. I believe these sims were conducted with random tie-breaking though (not Balinski-Laraki nonrandom tiebreak method). Maybe you should do sims first, emit flames second. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
