2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> > Jameson, > > I am not sure if we understand each other here. > I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives > (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. > If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the > quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, > for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in > candidates at places 2 and 5. >
OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint. The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an impossible task. > I think the problem is not restricted to STV, so other election > methods might be used and extended to resolve it, like Schulze STV. > The problem is not to quote in the underrepresented gender at place 2, > the problem is to proportionally quote-in the second seat at seat 3, 4 > or 5, in order to get a proportional distribution of the quoted-in > gender. > > A special case is when two women are elected to seats 1 and 2, and > three men are elected to seats 3, 4 and 5. > Here, the constraints are also breached, but with diferent gender for > seats 1 and 2 and for seats 3, 4 and 5. > > Again, it would be unfair, if, with three coalitions, the same > coalition would get both quoted-in candidates. > Now, the solution for this problem would be to look for > proportionality of quoted-in candidates. > I am not sure, that we are looking for proportionality within each > gender, but rather proportionality of quoted-in candidates. > > PZ > > > 2013/2/6 Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>: > > STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin > > Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better > than > > STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is > > clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply > ignore > > that gender of candidates on all ballots. That's not just about > > eliminations; it also means the count of the top preferences on each > > (reweighted) ballot means the top eligible preferences. > > > > So say there are 7 piles of votes (as an unrealistic illustrative > example): > > > > 18: W0 W1 M1 W2 > > 17: W0 W1 M2 W2 > > 16: W0 W1 M3 W2 > > 15: W0 W1 M4 W2 > > 14: W0 W1 M5 W2 > > 13: W0 W1 M6 W2 M5 > > 7: W3 > > > > For the first seat, the unanimous choice W0 wins, and all votes are > rescaled > > to 5/6 strength. For the second choice, you ignore the preferences for > > ineligible candidates W1, W2, and W3, and so M6 is eliminated and M5 wins > > with the transferred votes. Etc. > > > > Jameson > > > > 2013/2/5 Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> > >> > >> Dear all, > >> > >> We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our > >> party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party > >> and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.). > >> We used standard fractional STV, with strict quotas, valid empty > >> ballots, Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, no Meek. > >> It was the first bigger usage of STV in the Czech republic. > >> As a footnote, I would like to add, that one big advantage of > >> proportional election methods, is that it elects "the best people", > >> i.e. meaning the people, who have the biggest support in the > >> organisation. > >> > >> Now we would like to go on using STV for primary elections to party > >> lists in our party. > >> I have a good idea on how to do it using proportional ranking, but am > >> not entirely confident in how to implement the gender quotas. > >> So here I would like to ask you, the experts, for help. > >> I have only found some old papers in election-methods, but they are > >> not of any great help to resolve the following problem, unfortunately. > >> > >> The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows: > >> We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like > >> Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using > >> the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota > >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota) under the > >> following constraints: > >> Constraint 1: One of the first two seats has to go to a man and the > >> other seat has to go to a woman. > >> Constraint 2: One of seat three, four and five has to go to a man and > >> one of those seats has to go to a woman. > >> Say the "default" proportional ranking method elects women to all five > >> seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to > >> satisfy the constraints. > >> > >> Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be distributed in > >> order to insure > >> i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the > >> voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at > >> the same time > >> ii] that the proportional ranking method remains fairly proportional? > >> > >> --- > >> > >> Here is how I have been thinking about the problem myself. > >> I am not sure, however, that my line of thinking is the best or the > >> only one, so please read with a healthy amount of scepticism. > >> The problem can be re-formulated as follows. > >> Which method would make sure, > >> 1) that a large number of voters do not get both of the quoted seats? > >> 2) that the quoted seat is by default seat two and five, unless there > >> are compelling reasons to quote-in seat three or four (or, less > >> probably, seat one)? > >> > >> There is a trade-off between questions 1) and 2) above, i.e.: > >> a) if seat two and five are quoted, then a large number of the voters > >> might get both the quoted seats - which would lead the quotas to be > >> non-proportionally distributed, making some voters dissatisfied. > >> b) assume we always quote in seat two (this could, but need not be > >> necessary). If we, by using some appropriate proportionality measure > >> (has to be defined), quote-in the candidate at seat three, four or > >> five, then a fraction of one vote might decide, that the quoted-in > >> seat should be seat number three instead of seat five, or the rule > >> could "prefer" quoting in at place three, instead of place five, as > >> place three would need to have higher support, than place five. Such a > >> quota rule would ignore the fact, that place three is more important > >> than place five, i.e. that the disturbance in the proportionality of > >> the proportional ranking would be higher, if the candidate would be > >> quoted in at seat three than seat five. > >> > >> I.e. we search for > >> a) a quota proportionality measure and > >> b) a proportional ranking measure and > >> c) a rule, which "optimises" both the "quota proportionality" and the > >> "proportional ranking proportionality". > >> > >> I am sure the above was not entirely easy to digest. > >> I am happy to take your questions and will do my best to clarify. > >> Any references to relevant papers would be more than welcome. > >> > >> Best regards > >> Peter Zborník > >> ---- > >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list > info > > > > >
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