At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now, why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by agreement?
I have argued that the standard process could be improved by using Approval similarity, instead of vote-for-one, and other advanced voting systems could also be used, but it would be essential that members of the assembly *understand* the system!
A coin toss used to decide between two candidates when a certain regional organization is selecting a delegate to a world conference, and when no candidate could get a 2/3 vote after a substantial series of ballots. The choice, then, after such a series, was from the top two.
The thinking is that, if this impasse develops, there is a minority faction with strong opinions, and for organizational unity, they want that faction represented at the Conference. (Where consensus is sought, and, again, "consensus" is minimally a 2/3 vote -- and it's all advisory, in effect, the World Conference has no control over local groups.)
This kind of process can be made more efficient using Range Voting, but Approval is simple enough and functions similarly to Range, particularly if, in the first ballot, voters simply vote for one. I'd still allow voting for more than one in the first ballot, because if a voter has difficulty deciding which of two candidates to prefer, they should be able to just vote them equally.
I.e., Bucklin-ER simulates a series of these rounds, and could simply be continued until it finds a majority. The voters will figure it out.
In the world of voting systems, the power of repeated ballot has often been neglected. With a repeated ballot, no eliminations, each ballot is a new election (independent nominations, not restricted to the original set or a subset of it), the method is *extremely powerful.* It should not be abandoned, in particular, in favor of systems that promise completion with a single ballot, and Robert's Rules of Order specifically suggests otherwise. The do suggest the use of some system of preferential voting, but note that if voters don't fully rank, the election may have to be completed anyway (what they describe is critically different from IRV, in spite of what FairVote has claimed for years), *and* the method can fail to choose a "compromise winner." I.e., it suffers from center squeeze.
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