2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > >> However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is >> called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across >> http://www.panix.com/~tehom/**essays/hay-extended.html<http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html>, >> which seems to be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't >> really understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used >> to also make the two Random methods cloneproof. >> > > Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears.
Only virtually so, as with IRV. I agree that this virtual-multiround Hay is excessively complex for questionable benefits. The multiround stuff breaks the provable strategy-proofness, and what remains is largely handwaving. Even if that handwaving is in some deeper sense "correct" that strategy is ineffective, it could still fail to matter if people *believe* that strategy will pay off somehow. So the benefits are dubious; indeed, I very much doubt that they're worth the complexity. > Now, why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules > elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no > eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter > preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by > agreement? > > I have argued that the standard process could be improved by using > Approval similarity, instead of vote-for-one, and other advanced voting > systems could also be used, but it would be essential that members of the > assembly *understand* the system! > > A coin toss used to decide between two candidates when a certain regional > organization is selecting a delegate to a world conference, and when no > candidate could get a 2/3 vote after a substantial series of ballots. The > choice, then, after such a series, was from the top two. > > The thinking is that, if this impasse develops, there is a minority > faction with strong opinions, and for organizational unity, they want that > faction represented at the Conference. (Where consensus is sought, and, > again, "consensus" is minimally a 2/3 vote -- and it's all advisory, in > effect, the World Conference has no control over local groups.) > > This kind of process can be made more efficient using Range Voting, but > Approval is simple enough and functions similarly to Range, particularly > if, in the first ballot, voters simply vote for one. I'd still allow voting > for more than one in the first ballot, because if a voter has difficulty > deciding which of two candidates to prefer, they should be able to just > vote them equally. > > I.e., Bucklin-ER simulates a series of these rounds, and could simply be > continued until it finds a majority. The voters will figure it out. > > In the world of voting systems, the power of repeated ballot has often > been neglected. With a repeated ballot, no eliminations, each ballot is a > new election (independent nominations, not restricted to the original set > or a subset of it), the method is *extremely powerful.* It should not be > abandoned, in particular, in favor of systems that promise completion with > a single ballot, and Robert's Rules of Order specifically suggests > otherwise. The do suggest the use of some system of preferential voting, > but note that if voters don't fully rank, the election may have to be > completed anyway (what they describe is critically different from IRV, in > spite of what FairVote has claimed for years), *and* the method can fail to > choose a "compromise winner." I.e., it suffers from center squeeze. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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