At 12:12 PM 4/4/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to
be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really
understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to
also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now,
why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
agreement?
Not as I understood the description. Ordinary (not Extended) Hay
voting consists of voters submitting the rated ballots, and the Hay
method probabilistically picks a candidate. The method is designed
so that the optimal thing to do is for each voter to report ratings
proportional to their real utilities.
The "multiple" rounds of Extended Hay (again, if I understood it
right) don't actually happen. They're like the multiple rounds of
IRV: the algorithm goes through multiple stages, between which the
effective ratings change according to the logic of the algorithm
itself, but each voter only has to submit a single ballot.
Thus, I don't think your comments about organizational unity and
deliberation apply to this method. And yes, repeated ballot may be
more effective than single ballot, but that's not what extended Hay is about.
Okay -- the pages were not explicit about this. Is there a simple
description of Hay Voting?
However, the obvious complexity could be a fatal flaw in itself. The
impact of "strategic voting" on Range has been vastly overstated, if
the Range resolution is adequate. Such voting has a limited impact,
because Range never encourages preference reversal. Some have claimed
that optimal range voting will suppress preferences; my own opinion
is that this will happen to a much lesser degree than some expect.
The gain from bumping up a candidate a single rating to make it
equal, in Range of sufficient resolution, when one actually has a
preference, is small, and the satisfaction of actually expressing
true preference is high. We overthink how much people want to "win" elections.
(To be sure, we need systems where everyone wins. With Asset, there
is no incentive at all to vote for anyone other than your settled
favorite. I'd allow multiple votes, with them being fractionated,
because Asset wastes no votes, but only to avoid tossing ballots from
overvoting, or to help out a voter who really has trouble
distinguishing between two or more favorites. Asset has no losers,
only winners, as chosen, and in direct/representative Asset, where
electors may have an Assembly vote -- but not deliberative rights
directly -- that's absolute. And voters will know this and see this.
Their vote counts.)
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