On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across
http://www.panix.com/~tehom/essays/hay-extended.html , which seems to
be a proposal to make Hay voting cloneproof. I haven't really
understood the details yet, but I'm wondering if this could be used to
also make the two Random methods cloneproof.
Hay voting, as described, is a multiple-round system, it appears. Now,
why would this complex system be superior to standard Robert Rules
elections, i.e., vote for one, repeated ballot if no majority, no
eliminations with only voluntary withdrawals -- or shifts in voter
preferences -- , in an Assembly able to change rules, effectively, by
agreement?
Not as I understood the description. Ordinary (not Extended) Hay voting
consists of voters submitting the rated ballots, and the Hay method
probabilistically picks a candidate. The method is designed so that the
optimal thing to do is for each voter to report ratings proportional to
their real utilities.
The "multiple" rounds of Extended Hay (again, if I understood it right)
don't actually happen. They're like the multiple rounds of IRV: the
algorithm goes through multiple stages, between which the effective
ratings change according to the logic of the algorithm itself, but each
voter only has to submit a single ballot.
Thus, I don't think your comments about organizational unity and
deliberation apply to this method. And yes, repeated ballot may be more
effective than single ballot, but that's not what extended Hay is about.
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