Reason Lover wrote:
>Kant's criticism of Descartes is off target if he considered the Cogito
>to be a modus ponens or syllogism. I don't believe Descartes intended
>it that way at all.
Descartes denied that he acquired his knowledge this way; but, since he
stated it in the _Principles of Philosophy_ which he intended to be used
as a teaching text, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it would be
taught that way.
>But since I don't disagree with Kant's critical method, I won't
>disagree with his anti-Cartesian argument in terms of his own
>interpretation, the purpose of which was to judge transcendentally
>whether or not knowledge of the soul's nature was possible at all as
>conditioned by the sensibility and then determined by the
>understanding.
but is that really an accurate description of the outcome of Kant's
analysis? based on the quote included with my previous post, it seems to
me that Kant was saying that I, this instance of self-awareness, am not
able to know (from the fact of self-awareness alone) either that
self-awareness is a phenomenon produced by a brain or by a soul.
>You say Descartes' argument is irrefutably true. But Kant would say
>that it is true only analytically, and as such it adds nothing to our
>knowledge. And that of course is how Kant pursued this line of
>critique. But it adds nothing, not merely because it is circular and
>empty, but because there is a hidden, underlying assumption Kant
>believed was present in the argument: that the soul can serve as an
>object of contemplation for the understanding. This he called a
>paralogism.
when you say that the Experiento is 'true only analytically' are you
suggesting that it is false in some other way or that it is
uninformative or something else?
after concluding that 'I am' is a true statement, one may try to
discover whether I, this instance of self-awareness, is a phenomenon
produced by soul or by brain or both or something(s) else.
however, it is difficult see how Kant found hidden in the simple
statement 'I am' the rather complex assumption 'the soul can serve as an
object of contemplation for the understanding'.
it seems to me that all we can say (after learning or deciding that 'I
am' is necessarily true) is 'I know that I am; but, not what I am'.
Descartes then proceeds to try to discover whether the I that
necessarily is is a body or a soul.
Joe
--
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. --- H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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