One has to wonder whether philosophy is really done in the first person at all Joe. I think it is a mistake to believe one has to work on all that one accepts as knowledge.
On 10 Nov, 11:52, Joseph Polanik <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Reason Lover wrote: > > >Kant's criticism of Descartes is off target if he considered the Cogito > >to be a modus ponens or syllogism. I don't believe Descartes intended > >it that way at all. > > Descartes denied that he acquired his knowledge this way; but, since he > stated it in the _Principles of Philosophy_ which he intended to be used > as a teaching text, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it would be > taught that way. > > >But since I don't disagree with Kant's critical method, I won't > >disagree with his anti-Cartesian argument in terms of his own > >interpretation, the purpose of which was to judge transcendentally > >whether or not knowledge of the soul's nature was possible at all as > >conditioned by the sensibility and then determined by the > >understanding. > > but is that really an accurate description of the outcome of Kant's > analysis? based on the quote included with my previous post, it seems to > me that Kant was saying that I, this instance of self-awareness, am not > able to know (from the fact of self-awareness alone) either that > self-awareness is a phenomenon produced by a brain or by a soul. > > >You say Descartes' argument is irrefutably true. But Kant would say > >that it is true only analytically, and as such it adds nothing to our > >knowledge. And that of course is how Kant pursued this line of > >critique. But it adds nothing, not merely because it is circular and > >empty, but because there is a hidden, underlying assumption Kant > >believed was present in the argument: that the soul can serve as an > >object of contemplation for the understanding. This he called a > >paralogism. > > when you say that the Experiento is 'true only analytically' are you > suggesting that it is false in some other way or that it is > uninformative or something else? > > after concluding that 'I am' is a true statement, one may try to > discover whether I, this instance of self-awareness, is a phenomenon > produced by soul or by brain or both or something(s) else. > > however, it is difficult see how Kant found hidden in the simple > statement 'I am' the rather complex assumption 'the soul can serve as an > object of contemplation for the understanding'. > > it seems to me that all we can say (after learning or deciding that 'I > am' is necessarily true) is 'I know that I am; but, not what I am'. > Descartes then proceeds to try to discover whether the I that > necessarily is is a body or a soul. > > Joe > > -- > Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the > first person. --- H-N Castaneda > > @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@ > http://what-am-i.net > @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
